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Emerging Market Debt Instruments Play
Siren Song for Pension Plans
Ruth Rosauer
Pension fund managers have a fiduciary responsibility to
manage assets for the secure retirement of the beneficiary.
Under traditional standards of fiduciary duty, investments in
highly indebted nations would have constituted a breach of the
fiduciary's duty to not speculate with trust assests. However,
under current ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security
Act) guidelines, fiduciaries may include investments in emerg-
ing nation debt instruments. This Note argues that the country
risk component of some emerging nation debt instruments ren-
ders them too speculative for the unlimited investment of pen-
sion funds.
Part I of this Note begins with an overview of the interna-
tional debt crisis and corresponding U.S. bank difficulties of the
latter part of the 20th century. It describes many of the invest-
ment risks that arise when debtors and creditors are domiciled
in different nations, and identifies securitization as a relatively
new financing technique that disguises these risks. Part II dis-
cusses retirement funding for U.S. workers and regulation of
pension funds. In Part III, this Note proposes that the United
States should enact legislation which both recognizes and limits
the extent of the interrelationship between the capital needs of
developing countries and a pension plan manager's quest for
high rates of return. This Note concludes that such legislation
would be beneficial to both debtors and investors.
I. OVERVIEW OF DEBT CRISIS
In the continuum of relationships between entities who lend
money and those who borrow it, the party extending credit is
variously known as an investor, lender, banker, or creditor. The
distinction between these roles is largely based on the perceived
creditworthiness of the borrower. Credit arrangements can take
a variety of forms, including bonds and loans; collectively they
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are known as "instruments."' This supply of debt instruments
is referred to variously in this Note as emerging market debt,
developing country debt, and Third World debt.
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMERGING NATION DEBT
In the world of international finance, where a fluctuation of
a few basis points2 is cause for a press release, it is possible to
lose sight of the importance that debt instruments have for the
underlying trade, investment, and development needs of the
sovereign nations who are the debtors. For many nations, exter-
nal debt is a major component of public investment and current
consumption, including imports.3
Fundamentally, debts incurred by the sovereign nation are
the responsibility of its citizens. Debt repayment is inextricably
linked to their standard of living and can mean, in some in-
stances, the difference between life and death.4 Emerging na-
tion debt, sanitized though it may be in the autoclave of global
financial markets and lengthy contract negotiations in board-
rooms, remains a potentially destabilizing political force. 5
Third World debt is also important to the economies of cred-
itor nations, not just to those citizens and institutions which
have directly invested money in emerging market debt instru-
ments. For example, since American jobs depend on exports,6
1. Emerging market debt instruments have been defined as "all debt obli-
gations and equity interests... owed, issued or guaranteed by a public or pri-
vate sector entity located in a country that is not a member of the ... OECD."
EMERGING MARKETS TRADERS ASSOCIATION, CODE OF CONDUCT Sched. A (1992).
2. A basis point represents 1/100 of one percent. For example, if invest-
ment A yields a return of 7.16% and investment B yields a return of 7.18%,
there is a difference of two basis points. MARCIA STIGUM, MONEY MARKET CAL-
CULATIONS: YIELDS, BREAK EVENS, AND ARBITRAGE 19 (1981).
3. Funds can be used for immediate consumption or to finance the build-
ing of infrastructure and productive capacity. Either use will increase demand
for imports. Public sector borrowing is also used to finance social investments
such as education and health programs. IRVING S. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD DEBT
DILEMMA: MANAGING COUNTRY RISK 86-87 (1983).
4. According to UNICEF, 500,000 Third World children died in 1987 in
order to pay the interest on the national debt of their home countries. Nicholas
Eberstadt, UNICEF Cries Wolf, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1990, at A14.
5. In August and September of 1983, after a reduction in food subsidies
made necessary by IMF-imposed austerity measures, hungry Brazilians took to
looting supermarkets for food. See DARRELL DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK 213-19
(1984).
6. The U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce estimated that the drop in
Mexican imports from 1981 to 1982 due to the debt crisis resulted in the loss of
as many as 250,000 U.S. jobs. VINOD K. AGGARwAL, INTERNATIONAL DEBT
THREAT: BARGAINING AMONG CREDITORS AND DEBTORS IN THE 1980s 36 (1987).
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the debt crisis has significant domestic policy implications for
the United States.7
B. DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS
1. Historical Perspective
The "Buy Now, Pay Later" approach is not a phenomenon
new to the late 20th century; it has been used for over a century
to finance international trade and development.8 Since loans
from one country to another are inherently riskier than loans
between entities within the same country, there have been many
instances of loan default.9 Creditors have tried a variety of ap-
proaches as remedies against foreign nations who failed to honor
their obligations for timely debt servicing, with varying degrees
of success. 10
Several factors converged" in the late twentieth century to
cause a Third World debt crisis that threatened to undermine
7. Benjamin J. Cohen, High Finance, High Politics, in UNCERTAIN Fu-
TURE: COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE THIRD WORLD 107 (Richard E. Feinberg &
Valeriana Kallab, eds., 1984) (noting that debt rescheduling takes more inter-
national negotiation time and effort than any other issue).
8. Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational In-
vestment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the
Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 546
(1996).
9. Id. at 547. Latin American governments defaulted on loan payments in
the 1820s, 1870s, and 1930s. Andrew Bary, The Lust for Latin Debt: Yield-
Seeking Funds Downplay Perils in Brady Bonds, BARRON'S, Aug. 16, 1993, at 8,
9. Between 1970 and 1995, 30 countries defaulted at least once on their debt.
Room for Improvement, THE ECONOMIST, July 15, 1995, at 54.
10. European powers tried to physically administer the economic affairs of
Venezuela in 1902 when Venezuela was delinquent in its loan payments. They
were stopped by Theodore Roosevelt's willingness to use the U.S. Navy. When
the Dominican Republic defaulted on its debts to the United States in 1904,
Theodore Roosevelt placed an American receiver-general in charge of Domini-
can revenues and arranged for 55% of Dominican Customs receipts to go toward
the payment of its external debt. Similar interventions by the United States
occurred in Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua. Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 8,
at 547-48, n.24. The United States froze Russian assets in the United States
when the Bolsheviks reneged on Russian debts in 1917. Even so, it was not
until 1959 that creditors were repaid, and then it was only ten cents for every
dollar. Linda Sandler, U.S. Banks Prepare for the Possibility of Third-World
Debt Repudiation, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1984, at 17.
11. The 1970s witnessed an unprecedented increase in world interest rates
and a sharp rise in both oil prices and debt build-up by the debtor nations.
JEFFREY D. SACHS, DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 7-8
(1989); FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 53. Prices for commodities, the primary
source of income for developing nations' debt payments, dropped as much as
33% from the 1970s to 1982. Developing nations then had to borrow at high
interest rates at a time when their exports were fetching less on the world mar-
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the world's economy. 12 Outstanding U.S. bank loans to just the
seventeen most highly indebted developing nations were
equivalent to 130% of the lending banks' capital and reserves in
1982.13 Developing countries were paying as much as 50% of
their export earnings in interest payments on their loans.14
In August of 1982, Mexico announced that it could not ser-
vice its debt.15 Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela
quickly followed suit.16 Shortly thereafter many other nations
fell into arrears or stopped making payments on their loans.17
U.S. commercial banks and the World Bank18 initially dealt
with this crisis by lending the same debtors more money to
make their interest payments on the original debt and ignored
the underlying economic factors that signaled these loans were
in long-term difficulty. 19 Lending money to pay interest merely
increased developing nations' debt loads and did not increase
their capacity to ever repay the principal. 20
ket. JOHN H. MAKIN, THE GLOBAL DEBT CRISIS: AMERICA'S GROWING INVOLVE-
mENT 221 (1984).
12. A Dutch economist for Morgan Guaranty likened Mexico's decision to
suspend debt payments in 1982 to "an atom bomb being dropped on the world
financial system." DELAMAIDE, supra note 5, at 10. Other analysts warned that
the financial system in many industrialized countries would collapse due to the
Third World debt crisis. Lindley H. Clark, Jr., Speaking of Business: Let's
Merge the World Bank and the IMF, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1990, at A12; Peter
Torday, IMF Head Accuses Banks of Hurting Debt Crisis Strategy, WALL ST. J.,
May 11, 1988, at 43. The Third World and Eastern European countries had
combined foreign debts of $626 billion in 1982, triple the amount in 1971. By
the end of 1982,. about 40 nations had substantial payments problems, threat-
ening the world banking system. DELAMAIDE, supra note 5, at 7-8.
13. WILLIAM R. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT REEXAMINED 71 (1995).
14. Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuela's Burden of Debt and Violence, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 17, 1989, at A15.
15. Phillip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Mar-
ket and its Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701,
2708-09 (1996).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The World Bank, which had previously confined its lending to infra-
structure projects, made loans that were used to pay off overdue interest to
commercial banks. Paul Craig Roberts, The World Bank is Adding Fuel to the
Debt Tinderbox, Bus. WK., Nov. 7, 1988, at 21.
19. DELAMAIDE, supra note 5, at 25.
20. Id.
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2. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983
In 1983, Congress acknowledged the role of U.S. banks in
the Third World debt crisis when it passed the International
Lending Supervision Act (ILSA).21 Congress declared that:
It is the policy of the Congress to assure that the economic health and
stability of the United States and the other nations of the world shall
not be adversely affected or threatened in the future by imprudent
lending practices or inadequate supervision. This shall be achieved by
strengthening the bank regulatory framework to encourage prudent
private decisionmaking and by enhancing international coordination
among bank regulatory authorities.
22
Legislators had two goals in mind when they enacted ILSA.
They wanted to control, regulate, and supervise lending prac-
tices of creditor banks in the United States, yet encourage a con-
tinued, albeit reduced, flow of capital to debtor nations.23 Five
provisions in ILSA supervise and regulate commercial bank
lending abroad: (1) development of an early warning system to
alert banks to country risk and the adequacy of bank capital to
meet that risk;24 (2) stricter accounting rules about interna-
tional loan fees; 25 (3) increased reporting requirements of banks'
exposure to country risk;26 (4) increased cooperation between
U.S. agencies and other international regulatory agencies;2 7 and
(5) requirements for special reserves for specific types of interna-
tional loans.28 Furthermore, ILSA requires a bank to create Al-
located Transfer Risk Reserves (ATRRs) or, alternatively, to
"write-down" the value of the loan every time it lends to a very
heavily indebted country. 29
Legislators thought that banks would lend more responsibly
if they were subject to more scrutiny.30 Thus, ILSA requires
21. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 3901-12 (Supp. II 1984).
22. Id. at § 3901(a)(1)(2).
23. Lyle B. Vander Schaaf, Note, The International Lending Supervision
Act of 1983: Has it Had an Effect on the Latin American Debt Crisis?, 2 Am. U.J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 689, 696 (1987).
24. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3903, supra note 21.
25. Id. at § 3905.
26. Id. at §§ 3906, 3912.
27. Id. at § 3911.
28. Id. at § 3904. See Robert R. Bench & Dorothy A. Sable, International
Lending Supervision, 11 N.C. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 427, 428 (1986).
29. In practice, the regulatory agencies only required banks to use ATRRs
for a very few highly-indebted countries such as Nicaragua, Bolivia, Sudan, Po-
land, and Zaire. Vander Schaaf, supra note 23, at 697-99.
30. Salvatore 0. Franco, Note, Should Institutional Investors Play a Role
in Shaping Mexico's Economic Policy?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 489,
510 (1996).
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banks to submit quarterly reports to federal regulatory agencies
and the public. 31 The purpose of these reports is to allow deposi-
tors and investors to "assess the degree of diversification and
risk involved in bank investment portfolios." 32
ILSA increases the authority of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the Comptroller to is-
sue capital directives and cease and desist orders to banks who
fail to maintain adequate capital reserves for their international
loans.33 The administrative authority was strengthened by a
1991 case from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Bank of Cou-
shatta.34 ILSA has been more successful in enforcing remedial
measures for those banks who have taken on excessive interna-
tional risk than it has been in eliminating high country risk
from the lending portfolio. 35
C. FINANCIAL MARKET RESPONSE TO THE DEBT CRISIS
1. Brady Bonds
Mexico completed the first "Brady" bond deal in 1990.36 It
pooled together its external debts, repackaged them, and sold
them to investors around the world.37 The proceeds from the
sale of Brady bonds retired large chunks of Mexico's old higher
interest debt to commercial banks.38 The Brady bonds were
more palatable to international investors than Mexico's sover-
eign debt because the principal and first year of interest were
collateralized with U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bonds. 39 The col-
lateral is held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.40
31. Vander Schaaf, supra note 23, at 702.
32. Id.
33. Stephens B. Woodrough, Capital Directives: Obey 'Em or Else!, Am.
BANKER, June 25, 1991, at 4.
34. FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
a capital directive could be issued without a hearing first and was not subject to
judicial review).
35. Note, The Policies Behind Lending Limits, an Argument for a Uniform
Country Exposure Ceiling, 99 HARv. L. REV. 430, 448 (1985) [hereinafter Argu-
ment for Exposure Ceiling].
36. LEHMAN BROTHERS, BRADY BOND MARKET HANDBOOK 2 (1995). Brady
bonds take their name from the former Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Nicholas
Brady, who encouraged banks to participate in this form of financing. John E.
Rogers & Jonathan R. Hodes, Using the "Brady Bond" Approach in Mexican
Corporate Financing, 2 MEx. TRADE & L. REP. No. 4, at 5 (Apr. 1990).
37. Power, supra note 15, at 2720-22.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Edward M. Truman, The Mexican Peso Crisis: Implications for Inter-
national Finance, 82 FED. RESERVE BULL. 199, 202 n.9 (1996).
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The Brady bond market has expanded considerably since its
inception. 41  As of April 1997 the value of outstanding Brady
bonds totaled about $140 billion.42 Trading volume was $671
billion in the first quarter of 1997.4 3
2. Secondary Market for Emerging Nation Debt
A secondary market for Third World sovereign and private
sector debt started in 1982 as an informal network among com-
mercial and investment bankers.44 There was no formal report-
ing system for trades, and most trading was done privately. 45
The LDC debt market is not comprehensively regulated. 46  In-
sider trading has already occurred.47 Secondary market manip-
ulation can have serious repercussions for the debtor nation as
well as the investors. 48 Nevertheless, the market continues to
grow; in 1997, the total reported Third World debt market was
$1.16 trillion.49
41. As of March 1995, 12 countries had issued Brady bonds: Argentina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Jordan, Mexico, Nigeria,
Philippines, Poland, Uruguay, and Venezuela. LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note
36, at 6.
42. Mary D'Ambrosio, Brady Bonds: Thanks for the Memories, LDC DEBT
REP., Apr. 21, 1997, available in 1997 Wl 7939312.
43. Bradys No Longer Top Dog, Says EMTA, LDC DEBT REP., May 19,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7939432.
44. Michael Chamberlin et al., Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 415, 418 n.18 (1988).
45. James R. Kraus, Trading in Third World Debt Soars as Investors Rush
In, AM. BANKER, Sept. 17, 1991, at 10.
46. EMERGING MARKETS TRADERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 1, at 1. The Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has jurisdiction over some of the
bonds, but over none of the loans traded. The Federal Reserve focuses on regu-
lating the banks that make the loans, not on the loans themselves. Kelley Hol-
land, The LDC Debt Market: It's a Jungle Out There, Bus. WK., Mar. 15, 1993,
at 86, 87.
47. The Federal Reserve Board brought proceedings against Daniel Young,
former vice president of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, for alleged
violations of U.S. banking law in connection with trading Colombian debt. Tom
Mashberg, Two Indicted in Latin Loan Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 1993, at
37.
48. The Dart family acquired $1.4 billion of Brazilian debt and then in
1994 demanded that Brazil accelerate its payment of principal when it failed to
make timely debt service payments. At that time the Dart family was Brazil's
fourth largest creditor. Although the court dismissed the Darts' claim for accel-
eration, it upheld their breach of contract claim for $60 million. Brazil was
forced to alter its fiscal strategy as a result. Power, supra note 15, at 2747-51.
49. D'Ambrosio, supra note 42.
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D. EMERGING NATION DEBT INVESTMENT TRENDS
1. Third World Debt Problems Persist
It is tempting to think that due to an improved interna-
tional economy, the end of the oil crisis, lower international in-
terest rates, and systemic changes in loan intermediation the
debt crisis of the 1980s will not recur. 50 Although the average
debt service to export earnings ratio has been falling for develop-
ing country debt through the 1990s,51 developing countries owed
$2.2 trillion in 1997.52 The market for this debt remains vola-
tile, however, due to country risk factors, lack of comprehensive
regulation of the market, the potential for political instability in
debtor nations caused by austerity measures imposed by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), and independent external
events such as world interest rates, and the price of oil and other
commodities. 53
The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994 is proof that the risk of
investing in Third World countries persists. 54 Mexico did enact
most of the reforms urged by economists after its major debt cri-
sis of 1982. It privatized many industries and utilities, im-
proved tax collection, and reduced its deficit. 55 It attacked its
inflation problem and pegged its exchange rate to that of the
50. "[B]y 1992-93 the debt crisis was over as a major threat to industrial
country financial systems .... ." CLINE, supra note 13, at 87.
51. Emerging Market Indicators, ECONOMIST, APR. 6, 1996, AT 110.
52. Nick Nuttall, Earth Summit Backtracks on Aid to the Have-Nots, TIMES
(LONDON), JuNE 28, 1997, at 16.
53. See James North, Latin American Lands Are Burros, Not Tigers, Plod-
ding Forward, but Ready to Jump Back, BARRON's, Aug. 4, 1997, at 47. For a
discussion of country iisk factors see Lawrence Summers, Summers on Mexico:
Ten Lessons to Learn, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1995, at 46. World interest
rates were at unusually low levels in 1992-93. Although LIBOR (London In-
terBank Offering Rate) was at 14% in 1979-82, in 1992-93 it was only 3.5%.
Cline, supra note 13, at 473-77. Interest rates are likely to rise. Id. The col-
lapse of oil prices in 1986 had a significant impact on global debt strategies. Id.
at 125. The World Bank expects real oil prices to rise at an annual rate of 2.2%
from 1994 to 2002. Id. at 477-78. Commodity prices are an important factor in a
country's ability to generate export revenue. Id. at 113-15.
54. See generally Truman, supra note 40. On January 24, 1995, the Mexi-
can government was unable to raise short term capital, even when it tried to
compensate for the higher perceived risk by raising interest rates 7% from the
week before. Two of the causes of this crisis were higher interest rates in the
United States, which made Mexican investments less attractive, and political
instability.
55. James D. Humphrey II, Note, Foreign Affairs Powers and "The First
Crisis of the 21st Century": Congressional vs. Executive Authority and the Stabi-
lization Plan for Mexico, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 181, 183 (1995).
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United States.5 6 In addition, it reduced trade barriers and be-
gan political reform.57 Furthermore, Mexico - as the United
States' third largest trading partner - was considered by many
to be "too important to fail."58 The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994,
therefore, took many by surprise. Despite a massive loan from
the IMF, the peso fell to its lowest level in history, and reserves
were down to $2 billion when President Clinton announced an
emergency loan package on January 31, 1995. 59 The United
States and the IMF will not always be able to offer such tremen-
dous aid to debtor nations.60 The Federal Reserve has warned
that investors in foreign debt instruments should be more care-
ful in the future.61
2. Evolving Instruments
Brady bonds were originally issued with collateral such as
U.S. Treasury bonds, 62 which reduced the risk for holders of
Third World debt. 63 Unfortunately, the media has a tendency to
simply identify Brady bonds with U.S. Treasuries; 64 therefore,
unwary investors may unwittingly buy non-collateralized Brady
bonds under the assumption that they are completely safe.
While it is true that Brady bonds are the safest investment in
the emerging nation debt market, it is only their principal that
is fully collateralized. 65
The Brady bond denominated in U.S. dollars is not the only
foreign debt instrument drawing the interest of American inves-
tors. Mexico has converted many of its outstanding Brady bonds
into uncollateralized Eurobonds 66 denominated in pesos rather
than dollars. 67 Debt denominated in local currency accounts for
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 190.
59. Id. at 196. The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994 began in mid-December
1994. Truman, supra note 40, at 204-205.
60. Truman, supra note 40, at 203.
61. Id.
62. Rogers & Hodes, supra note 36, at 5.
63. CLINE, supra note 13, at 479.
64. "When a country's foreign debt is converted into so-called Brady bonds,
which are U.S. Treasury securities... ."John C. Edmunds, Securities: The New
World Wealth Machine, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept 11, 1995, at 128.
65. Rogers & Hodes, supra note 36, at 6.
66. Although Eurobonds must be issued in Europe, they can be denomi-
nated in any currency. Any nation can issue Eurobonds, as long as they are
issued "outside the confines of any national capital market." Stigum, supra
note 2, at 184.
67. Daisy Maxey, The Standouts in a Drab Year, BARRoN's, Dec. 30, 1996.
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63% of all emerging nation debt.68 Emerging nation debt portfo-
lio managers are buying these investments to enhance their
portfolios because the yields are better and they reduce the cor-
relation to U.S. Treasuries that collateralized Brady bonds
have.69
3. The Changing Investor
Holders of Third World debt are no longer just large com-
mercial banks with staff economists to provide country risk
analysis. 70 Americans with IRAs and 401(k) funds are now in-
vesting in emerging market funds.71 Large pension funds began
investing in emerging nation debt in 1991.72 Mutual funds pro-
vide opportunities for individual investors to own small pieces of
emerging market debt.7 3 High yields relative to U.S. Treasuries
are tempting them to do So. 74 In 1996, emerging market debt
yielded returns of 30% to 40%, compared with a yield on 30-year
U.S. Treasuries that was less than 7% during that year.75 Total
U.S. tax-exempt money in emerging market debt instruments
was more than $20 billion in 1995.76 Investors' perception of the
market has changed. Now that Brady bonds have been around
for more than a decade, there is a general belief that "emerging
markets instruments are simply another type of high-yielding,
high-risk asset" in a portfolio.77
4. Securitization
Securitization is a complex financing arrangement whereby
an "issuer" raises money by selling the right to receive future
68. Bill Hinchberger, Local Heroes: Investor Interest in Latin Currency
Debt is Running High, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1, 1997, at 137, 141.
69. Id.
70. When making international loans, banks hire professionals to monitor
country risk. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 9.
71. Humphrey, supra note 55, at 191; Kraus, supra note 45, at 10.
72. Kraus, supra note 55, at 10.
73. In 1996 there were 21 mutual funds primarily invested in emerging
market bonds. Maxey, supra note 67.
74. Bary, supra note 9, at 54.
75. The J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus yielded 39.3%,
and the GMO Emerging Country Debt Fund returned 66.3% for 1996. Healthy
'97 Rise Won't Rival Huge '96 Gains, LDC DEBT REP., Jan. 6, 1997, available in
1997 WL 7939045.
76. Emerging Markets Beckon Pension Funds, LDC DEBT REP., Sept. 23,
1996, available in 1996 WL 5559953 at *2.
77. Ali Naqvi, Diversification Means Staying Power, LDC DEBT REP., Sept.
23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5559961.
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monies to be generated from a group of assets.78 The issuer bun-
dles together assets that are similar in some respect and are ex-
pected to produce a stable cash flow. 79 The issuer sells its right
to receive this future income into a pool which in turn sells
shares to investors through private placements or public offer-
ings.80 If the securitization is successful, the issuer gets imme-
diate liquidity,81 and the investors receive a steady stream of
income from the pool.8 2
Securitization began in 1970 with the issuance of "Ginnie
Maes."8 3 Since then, the securitization market has exploded, as
evidenced by more than $1.9 trillion in securitizations outstand-
ing in 1994.84 Securitized investments are now offered for a va-
riety of assets such as automobile loans, oil, and prospective
soybean crops.8 5 Market acceptance of emerging nation securi-
tizations has been enthusiastic.8 6 About $8 billion in securitiza-
tions originated in emerging markets in 1996.87
Securitization has altered the international economic sys-
tem.88 It is a revolutionary concept in financing because it takes
one entity and splits it into two credit ratings: one for the origi-
nal issuer and another for the securitization.8 9 This split is of
immense value to an issuer located in a nation with a low credit
rating because securitization offers the potential to access capi-
tal at a lower cost.90 Credit rating agencies had a long-standing
practice of not awarding any entity within a nation a better
78. Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1067 (1996).
79. Charles E. Harrell, et al., Securitization of Oil, Gas, and Other Natural
Resource Assets: Emerging Financing Techniques, 52 Bus. LAw 885, 887 (May
1997).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 886-87.
82. Hill, supra note 78, at 1068.
83. Ginnie Maes are bite-sized pieces of a bundle of residential mortages
insured by the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administra-
tion. Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 137, 140 (1989).
84. Hill, supra note 78, at 1062.
85. Suzanne Woolley, What's Next, Bridge Tolls? Almost Any Risk Can Be
Securitized - But Quality May Be Iffy, Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 1996, at 64, 65.
86. An Argentinean oil company issued a securitization in January 1994
that was oversubscribed by 300%. Junk Bonds: Emerging, Converging, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 79 [hereinafter Junk Bonds].
87. Aaron Elstein, Banks Joining Parade of Buyers of Asset-Backed Paper
From Third World, AM. BANKER, Nov. 13, 1996, at 32.
88. Edmunds, supra note 64, at 118.
89. Harrell, supra note 79, at 887.
90. Id.
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credit rating than the nation itself.9 1 In 1993 Standard & Poor's
departed from this tradition when it rated a securitization indi-
rectly issued by an agency of the Mexican government higher
than Mexico's foreign currency senior debt.92
There are still risks to investments in securitizations. The
issuer may declare bankruptcy, 93 or the asset may not produce
the projected revenue. 94 Even if the issuer lives up to its prom-
ised potential, there is the possibility that the sovereign nation
will expropriate the commodity. 95 A sovereign government also
has the right to change the regulations applicable to a certain
business.96
Securitization of Third World debt is a very new financing
technique, and the global economy has been relatively good since
its inception. 97 No one knows, however, how risky these invest-
ments will be in an economic downturn.98 Eventually, securi-
tization instruments will grow in importance as a means of
financing international trade and infrastructure projects. 99
Bankers, investors, and rating agencies will become more so-
phisticated in assessing the risk of these instruments. 100 In the
meantime, emerging nation securitizations continue to be high
risk investments. Securitizations are considered to be in the
same league as junk bonds, even by their proponents. 1° 1
91. Junk Bonds, supra note 86, at 79.
92. Harrell, supra note 79, at 890.
93. Hill, supra note 78, at 1078 (explaining that, upon bankruptcy, the con-
veyance possibly will not be respected).
94. Marissa C. Wesely, Securitizing Project Debt, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
SECURITIZATION 1996, 747 P.L.I. COM. L. & PRAc. 335, 376 (Dec. 1996).
95. Id. at 381. It is possible for investors to purchase insurance from the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation to cover currency risk, expropria-
tions, and political violence. Harrell, supra note 79, at 903. A related problem
is that it is sometimes difficult to tell the difference between private and public
assets in developing countries. For example, in 1996, Citicorp negotiated a
securitization involving the future telephone bills in Pakistan. The Pakistani
government, however, because it owned the phone company, forbade the selling
of what it considered a national asset. The investors and Citicorp are still try-
ing to settle the matter. Aaron Elstein, Investors Leery of 'Future Flow' Securi-
ties, AM. BANKER, June 26, 1997, at 26.
96. For example, one securitization soured when Colombia added a 20%
surcharge and revoked a power project's tax exemptions. Dam Good Business
This, Chaps, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 1995, at 61.
97. North, supra note 53, at 48.
98. Id. See also Elstein, supra note 87, at 32 (stating that because the
Latin American economy has been strong since securitization gained popular-
ity, it is unclear how securitizations will react in an economic slowdown).
99. Wesely, supra note 94, at 387-88.
100. Id.
101. See generally Puchala, supra note 83, at 143-47.
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5. Lack of Transparency
Securitization is not the only stumbling block to trans-
parency in the emerging nation debt market. Investors can un-
wittingly increase their investments in developing countries by
buying bank stock 10 2 or mutual funds. 10 3 Mutual funds are in-
creasing their holdings of higher risk emerging nation debt, and
unsophisticated mutual fund investors may not be aware of the
type of risk they are buying. 10 4 The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is concerned because many mutual funds
now invest substantial parts of their portfolios in investments,
such as emerging nation debt, that bear no relation to the name
of the funds. 105 This is of concern because many investors
choose a mutual fund based on its name.' 0 6 Currently, only
65% of a mutual fund's assets must be invested in securities that
are related to the name of the fund.' 0 7 Even vigilant investors
who read the fund prospectus will find a dearth of clear informa-
tion about the emerging nation debt component of the
portfolio. 108
6. Elements of Country Risk
Investors in the secondary market for Third World debt face
another set of risks referred to collectively as "country risk."
Country risk refers to situations in which the host country is
unable to facilitate transfers of its currency.109 Even a pur-
102. U.S. banks are taking advantage of a loophole in SEC regulations
wherein they do not have to report investments in a single nation that are less
than 0.75% of the bank's total assets. This reporting requirement excludes bank
holdings of Brady bonds entirely. Hidden Horrors, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 22,
1994, at 95.
103. Bary, supra note 9, at 8.
104. Gregory Zuckerman, More Bond Mutual Funds Are Taking On Risks
And Only The Most Wary Investors May Know It, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1997, at
C1.
105. Id. at C25.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. For example, the Strong Opportunity Fund prospectus includes the ca-
veat that "the Fund may invest up to 5% of its net assets in non-investment
grade debt obligations." STRONG FuNDs, THE STRONG GROWTH FuNDs PROSPEC-
Tus 1-13 (May 1997). Although the Strong Opportunity Fund's description says
it "may invest up to 25%" of its assets in "foreign securities," it does not specify
the types of securities - or which countries - in which the fund will invest.
The unwary investor may not realize that "foreign" can just as easily mean
Zaire as Belgium. Only if the investor then turns to another section, Implemen-
tation of Policies and Risks, will the investor read a brief and superficial ac-
count of possible foreign investment risks. Id. at 1-17-24.
109. Harrell, supra note 79, at 902.
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chaser of an investment not issued by the sovereign itself, but by
a private entity, still bears the risk that not only will the issuer
not honor the debt, but that an element of country risk outside
the private borrower's control may prevent repayment.I10
Some elements of country risk are beyond the control of the
sovereign government. Contagion affects the credit rating of a
nation. This results when the economic conditions of a geo-
graphically or economically similarly-situated nation have a
spillover effect on the perceived creditworthiness of the host
nation."'
Country risk is so unpredictable that even sophisticated rat-
ing agencies are not always able to gauge it with accuracy. 112
Standard & Poor's, for example, gave a positive outlook for a
future upgrade on Mexican debt shortly before the Mexican Peso
Crisis of 1994.113 Part of the reason that even professional ana-
lysts have difficulty assessing country risk correctly is the diffi-
culty in obtaining timely data from emerging nations about their
economic fundamentals. 114
110. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Electronic "Checks" and "Purses: The New Pay-
ment Systems, in THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW COMMERCIAL CODE, SB29
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 224, 248 (Dec. 12-14, 1996). Country risks inherent in interna-
tional investments are:
(i) deterioration in the value of the sovereign's currency in relation to
the currency in which the issuer's debt is denominated (i.e. exchange
rate risk); (ii) imposition of exchange controls or similar actions that
could limit convertibility of the sovereign's currency (i.e. transfer risk);
(iii) deterioration of general business and economic environment or
detrimental regulatory actions; (iv) declaration of a moratorium or
similar prohibition or restriction against any payments on external
debt; (v) temporary diversion of debt service payments; (vi) expropria-
tion of the issuer or its property and repudiation of its debt; and (vii)
civil unrest, including social and labor disturbances.
Weseley, supra note 94, at 375.
111. James C. Allen, OCC Moves to Lessen Risk Of Emerging Markets
Fiascos, AM. BANKER, Dec. 22, 1995, at 20 ("One of the things we've seen with
respect to the situations with the peso is that the various emerging markets
may not be as disconnected as previously thought.... [Flollowing the collapse
of the peso, we saw volatile movements in currencies and interest rates in Asia
and other markets").
112. Room for Improvement, THE ECONOMIST, July 15, 1995, at 54 (sug-
gesting that agencies have trouble gauging the risk because of their lack of ex-
perience and the inexact science of the practice).
113. Id.
114. Mexico, for instance, was "clearly less than forthcoming about [its] eco-
nomic and financial situation" prior to the Peso Crisis of 1994. Truman, supra
note 35, at 208. Full disclosure of economic factors will benefit the debtor na-
tion because more investment will be attracted. Mexico now makes its fiscal
information available on the Internet. Summers, supra note 53, at 46.
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E. EFFECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ON THE DEBTOR NATION
Portfolio investment supplied 50% of all net external fi-
nance to Latin America between 1982 and 1992.115 Without im-
mediate returns, portfolio investors will quickly move their
capital elsewhere. 116 This strategy of maximizing short-term
gain makes portfolio investment a potentially destabilizing force
to the developing nations in which they invest.11 7 With the ad-
vent of today's global financial marketplace and advances in
telecommunications, any hint that the investment climate in a
country is turning negative - whether true or false - can send
that country's economy into a tailspin. 18 The power of the port-
folio investor is so strong that even large, industrialized nations,
such as the United States, are not always able to resist their
force.119
Another factor emerging nations should consider in relation
to portfolio investment is what the portfolio investor will do in
the event that the emerging nation needs to seek reschedul-
ing.120 During previous debt crises, the commercial bank credi-
tors collectively met and negotiated new deals with the debtor
nation.121 The IMF, World Bank, and Federal Reserve exerted
pressure on these banks, forcing them to cooperate with debtors
by threatening them with the possibility of new regulations. 122
Such cooperation is bound to be lacking from an extremely large
and diverse group of portfolio investors. 23
115. Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 8, at 542.
116. Id. at 543.
117. Local stock markets can be disrupted, interest rates can shift dramati-
cally, and the local business climate can be damaged in the wake of sudden,
large shifts in portfolio investments. Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 8, at 543.
See generally David Wessel, Closing the Door, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1997, at
R21 (discussing the instability caused by quick withdrawals of capital and the
questionable benefits of short-term capital for developing countries).
118. Edmunds, supra note 64, at 127-33. A small country that is dependent
on foreign trade can be devastated by media speculation, even if its economic
condition is sound, as foreign exchange exits and liquidity dries up on the basis
of a rumor. Id. at 131.
119. Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 8, at 543 n.5.
120. Not an unrealistic concern, considering that the Paris Club negotiated
more than 60 reschedulings from 1956 to 1983. Debt Rescheduling: What Does
It Mean? FIN. & DEV., Sept. 1983, at 26, 28. See generally Humphrey, supra
note 55, at 190-91 (describing difficulties of debt rescheduling negotiation when
lenders are a large group of relatively small investors rather than a concen-
trated cadre of commercial creditors).
121. Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 8, at 593.
122. Id. at 594.
123. Holders of securitized emerging market debt are "the big gap in the
international system for handling sovereign crises" because tens of thousands
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There is also the potential that large institutional investors
will take on a more assertive role. 124 This is exactly what has
happened with a large pension portfolio managed for the Califor-
nia Public Employees Retirement System (CALPERS).1 25 When
IBM, General Motors, and American Express stocks were per-
forming poorly, CALPERS demanded that the executives of
those companies be replaced. 126 Certainly, no sovereign nation
would want to tolerate such interference in its own internal af-
fairs to retain large portfolio capital investments. 127 Developing
nations should implement measures designed to lessen the po-
tential negative impacts which the volatility and short-term in-
vestment strategies of portfolio investors create. 128
II. RETIREMENT FUNDING
A. RETIREMENT DEMOGRAPHICS
Congress enacted Social Security legislation as part of the
New Deal in the 1930s. 129 The government never intended this
federal program to be the sole, or even the primary, source of
support for retired workers. 130 Benefits were intended to pay
about 45% of a worker's earnings during one year of employ-
ment. 131 Today's Social Security surplus will disappear by
2019.132 By the year 2030, there will be only two workers for
of individuals have replaced the bank syndicates. The sheer number of credi-
tors makes it impossible for them to organize, as banks did in the 1980s, to
reschedule debt. Summers, supra note 53, at 48.
124. Franco, supra note 30, at 494.
125. David L. Gregory, The Problematic Status of Employee Compensation
and Retiree Pension Security: Resisting The State, Reforming The Corporation,
5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 37, 40 (1995).
126. Id.
127. Something like this happened with the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994
when the Weston Group, which specialized in Latin American investments for
large investors such as Fidelity Investment, suggested six changes in fiscal pol-
icy that Mexico could make to attract and retain U.S. investors. Carrasco &
Thomas, supra note 8, at 590.
128. Debtor nations can discourage excessive portfolio capital by direct
measures such as taxes, limits on offshore borrowing, or limits on consumption
credit. Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 8, at 597-98; Wessel, supra note 117, at
R23.
129. Social Security Act (Old Age Pension Act) 42 U.S.C. § 301-1399 (1935).
See also Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income
and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1123 (1997).
130. Dilly, supra note 129 at 1120.
131. Id.
132. William G. Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARv.
J. ON LEGIS. 462, 480 (1996).
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each retiree.133 Indeed, many of those under 40 believe there
will be no Social Security payout for them when they retire. 34
Average life expectancy has been increasing. 135 This means
that, on average, the current generation is likely to have higher
medical expenses than did the previous generations.136 As a re-
sult of all these factors, there has been an increased emphasis on
private saving for pensions, both by individuals and the corpora-
tions who employ them. For many Americans, their pension
plan represents their largest financial asset. 13
7
Pension funds have become one of the largest collections of
investment monies in the world. The collective assets of U.S.
pension plans are $3 trillion and constitute 40% of the capital in
the United States. 138 The world's 300 largest pension funds
grew by 14.3% in 1993 and by similar amounts in 1994 and
1995.139
B. REGULATION OF PENSION FUNDS
It became obvious by the 1970s that corporate pension plans
were not failproof. As a result of a CBS television expos6
describing how corporate bankruptcies, specifically in the Horn
& Hardart and Studebaker Worthington companies, had re-
sulted in substantial losses for pension beneficiaries, 140 the U.S.
government created both the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA) and the Pensions Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion (PBGC) in 1974.141
133. Kay Harvey, As Youth Fades, Boomers Shape Next Life Stage, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 12, 1997, at 12A.
134. Only slightly more than one third of Americans have confidence in the
future of Social Security. Dauster, supra note 132, at 469-70.
135. W. Brantley Phillips, Jr., Chasing Down the Devil: Standards of Pru-
dent Investment Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 335, 383 (1997).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 382.
138. Alvin D. Lurie, ETIS: A Scheme For the Rescue of City and Country
with Pension Funds, 5 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 315, 333 (1996).
139. Edmunds, supra note 64, at 121.
140. Douglas A. Love, ERISA: The Law Versus Economics, 25 GA. L. REV.
135, 137 (1990).
141. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001-1461. James B. Shein, A Limit on Downsizing: Varity Corp. v. Howe, 24
PEPP. L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1996).
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1. ERISA
The principal aims of ERISA are to prevent the default of
pension plans and prohibit self-dealing by pension fiduciaries. 142
The two federal agencies charged with responsibility for the ad-
ministration of ERISA are the Department of Labor (DOL) and
the Treasury Department. 143 The DOL has jurisdiction over re-
porting and fiduciary obligations.144 Government employee pen-
sion plans, defined contribution plans, church plans, and
insurance contract plans are excluded from ERISA oversight.145
Only defined benefit plans are subject to ERISA's minimum
funding requirements. 146
Employers have relied on two main techniques to finance
pension plans: trust funds and insurance contracts. 147 Fiducia-
ries "control and manage pension plans and their assets."148
They must act with prudence, solely for the benefit of plan
participants, and they must diversify to minimize risk. 49
ERISA preempts all state laws relating to pension plans. 15 0
2. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
The PBGC is the insurer of last resort for the nation's
40,000 defined-benefit pension plans.151 Its protection is analo-
gous to the FDIC's protection of consumer bank accounts. 152
When the PBGC decides that an employer's pension plan is un-
derfunded, the PBGC terminates the plan and pays minimum
142. Deborah M. Weiss & Marc A. Sgaraglino, Prudent Risks for Anxious
Workers, 1996 WIs. L. REV. 1175, 1190 (1996).
143. Jacqueline Grossman, Researching Hot Topic Practice Areas: Employee
Benefits, in MANANGING THE PRIVATE LAw LIBRARY 1989: DELIVERING INFORMA-
TION SERVICES, 278 P.L.I./PATENTs, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY
PROP., 459, 462 (July 1989).
144. Id.
145. ERISA § 1321(b); 1081(a)(8).
146. Grossman, supra note 143, at 467.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Harold Novikoff & Seth Gardner, Single-Employer and Multiemployer
Pension Plan Liabilities in Bankruptcy Code Cases, in CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS
REORGANIZATIONS, SB37 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 369, 373 (May 8, 1997).
151. See also John F. Wasik, How to Protect Your Pension, CONSUMER DIG.,
Nov./Dec. 1996, at 35, 42 (stating that ERISA created the PBGC with the inten-
tion of making the agency "an insurer of last resort," and that the PBGC only
guarantees a maximum of approximately $2,600 per month per pensioner upon
taking over a failed plan).
152. Id. at 35.
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benefits to those who were covered by it. 153 More than 120 pen-
sion plans were terminated in 1995.154 The PBGC has termi-
nated the pension plans of such well-known names as Schwinn
Bicycle, Pan Am, and Allis-Chalmers. 5 5
The PBGC suffered a deficit of $2.9 billion in 1993.156 A
1993 Congressional research report compared the potential
harm of this problem to that caused by the savings and loan
bail-out of the 1980s.157 There has been concern about the long
term solvency of the PBGC.'58 Even when the PBGC is fully
funded, however, the employees it is supposed to rescue may get
far less than they expected.' 5 9
The PBGC is in better health now due to higher interest
rates and the increased pension contributions mandated by the
Retirement Protection Act mandates. 160 In 1996, the PBGC an-
nounced its first surplus. 161
3. The Retirement Protection Act of 1994
The Retirement Protection Act of 1994 (RPA) was enacted
as part of the legislation adopting the Uruguay Round of the
GATT.162 The RPA recognizes that other GATT provisions will
result in at least short-term reductions in federal revenues due
to decreased tariffs. 163 By amending ERISA and the Internal
Revenue Code, the RPA helps offset this decrease in revenue by
153. Id. at 39.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Leigh Allyson Wolfe, Is Your Pension Safe? A Call for Reform of the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Protection of Pension Benefits, 24
Sw. U. L. REV. 146, 153 (1994).
157. Wasik, supra note 151, at 42.
158. Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investing: Doing Good
Versus Doing Well In An Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 23 (1992).
159. Some Pan Am employees found that the PBGC, which took over the
bankrupt Pan Am pension fund, paid little more than half the monthly pension
benefits they had been promised. Albert R. Karr, Imperilled Promises: Risk to
Retirees Rises As Firms Fail to Fund Pensions They Offer, WALL ST. J. Feb. 4,
1993, at Al.
160. Id.
161. Glen Burkinn, Pension Guarantee Agency Posts Surplus for First Time,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1997, at A4.
162. Retirement Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 108 Stat.
5012; Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round (1994), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994). See also Novikoff& Gardner, supra note 150,
at 374.
163. Jeffrey R. Houle, How GATT Changes American Pension Plans, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1995, at 20 (photo. reprint, Mar. 1995).
19981 229
MIN. J GLOBAL TRADE
increasing other sources of revenue. 164 Specifically, the RPA
will result in smaller lump-sum distributions from defined bene-
fit plans by changing the interest rate formula. 165 It will also
base cost of living increases for defined benefit plans on third,
rather than fourth quarter inflation rates. 166 This will lower the
amount of income that will qualify as tax-deferred.1 67 Ordina-
rily, any reductions in participants' benefits such as these would
be prohibited by ERISA. 168 As part of GATT, the RPA provi-
sions will take precedence over ERISA.169 A positive note for
retirees is contained in two provisions of the RPA which
strengthen the pension system-the RPA raises the funding
minimums for defined benefit plans and increases premiums
paid to the PBGC.170
C. TRENDS IN FUNDING PENSIONS
1. Movement from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution
Traditionally, pensions were "defined benefit" plans which
promised employees a specific amount of payments after retire-
ment.' 71 In a defined benefit plan, the employer bears the risk
that contributions to the pension asset pool and decisions about
their investment will result in sufficient funds to meet its long-
term pension obligations.' 72 Under a defined contribution plan,
however, employees are not guaranteed a specific pension by
their employer when they retire. 73
Employers have created more defined contribution pension
plans than defined benefit plans since ERISA was enacted.' 74
Employers prefer defined contribution plans because they shift
the risk of the pension investment decisions to the employee. 175
Employers also favor defined contribution plans because there
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 21.
169. Id. at 20 ("GATT provides ... that any plan amendments adopted to
comply with the new rules will not be deemed prohibited cut backs").
170. Id. at 21.
171. Love, supra note 140, at 136.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. There have been 150,000 more defined contribution plans than defined
benefit plans created since the enactment of ERISA. 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions
and Retirement Funds § 15 (1988).
175. 401(k)s Bank on Markets, REC. N. N. J. A14, JAN. 2, 1996 available in
1996 WL 6124902.
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are no minimum funding requirements, no PBGC premiums,
and no actuarial certifications.1 7 6 Employees like them because
they have the ability to choose their pension fund invest-
ments. 177 However, there is concern that the average worker
will not have the expertise necessary to make good investment
choices with his defined contribution pension plan. 178
2. Managing Risk Through Diversification
The fiduciary rules of ERISA regulate pension invest-
ments. 179 ERISA has its foundation in the common law of
trusts, 18 0 which imposed two duties on the fiduciary: invest-
ments must be individually prudent, and the overall portfolio
must be diversified.' 8l The first duty evolved into the "prudent
man" rule.' 8 2 ERISA defines this as "the care, skills, prudence,
and diligence ... that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with such matters would use .... 183 Under this
prudent man standard, certain types of investments were
judged too imprudent for a trust corpus.' 84 Examples include
securities purchased for speculation and shares in new and un-
tried enterprises.185 Traditional trust law also required that the
fiduciary diversify unless it was imprudent to do so.'
8 6
The law of private trusts and ERISA fiduciary standards
are no longer as congruent as they were when ERISA was en-
acted.' 8 7 The fiduciary duty for a private trust is now incorpo-
rated in the Third Restatement of Trusts,' 88 which utilizes the
"prudent investor" standard for management of trust assets.' 8 9
176. Howard J. Peyser & Gary Blank, Design and Operation of 40l(k) Plans,
in UNDERSTANDING ERISA 1995, 370 PLI/Tax 603, 608 (1995).
177. Id.
178. Independent economic variables such as increased inflation could leave
retirees without as much spending capacity as they had anticipated. In that
event, some predict that the retirees will petition the federal government for
relief, and the federal government will force employers to transfer wealth from
stockholders to employees. Love, supra note 140, at 141.
179. Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 142, at 1177.
180. Id. at 1184.
181. Id. at 1186.
182. Id. at 1185.
183. ERISA § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1994).
184. Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 142, at 1185.
185. Id. at 1185 n.22.
186. Id. at 1186.
187. Id. at 1196.
188. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 227 (1990). See also Weiss & Sgarag-
lino, supra note 142, at 1196.
189. Phillips, supra note 135, at 345.
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Under this new approach to trust investment, no specific secur-
ity or category of security is outlawed because it is too inherently
risky or speculative. 190 ERISA does not bar any individual in-
vestment as being too risky per se, either.191 To paraphrase Will
Rogers, the "prudent investor" has never met an investment he
didn't like. Junk bonds, international investments, vulture
funds, and gold can now be pension fund assets. 192 The old stan-
dard which prohibited investment in "new and untried enter-
prises" or "unseasoned entities," thereby keeping fund trustees
from speculative investments such as junk bonds and leveraged
buyouts, no longer provides a bright line between permissible
and proscribed investments. 193
The guiding principle of portfolio theory is that "[t]wo assets
properly combined may have less risk than either asset
alone." 194 The trick to responsible portfolio management is
identifying assets whose risks are negatively correlated with
each other.195 The traditional example of two negatively corre-
lated assets offsetting each other's risk is the diversified portfo-
lio with stock in companies that make umbrellas and
sunglasses. 196 An optimally diversified portfolio, with nega-
tively correlated risks, will eliminate "unique" risks that are
company or industry specific.197 Investors are not compensated
for unique risks; therefore, it is not prudent to assemble a port-
folio that does not diversify away such risks.198
It is in the duty to diversify that the Restatement and
ERISA have parted ways. Under the Second Restatement there
were no exemptions to this duty to diversify. 199 The Third Re-
statement allows greater latitude in matters of diversifica-
tion. 200 ERISA case law has eliminated any fiduciary duty to
diversify.201 Under current ERISA standards, a fund can con-
190. Id. at 354.
191. 29 C.F.R. §2550.404a-1 (1996).
192. Arthur H. Kroll, Nontraditional Investments Under ERISA: Panning
for Gold, 9 PROB. & PROP. 23-25 (1995).
193. Michael T. Johnson, Speculating on the Efficacy of Speculation: An
Analysis of the Prudent Person's Slipperiest Term of Art in Light of Modern
Portfolio Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 419, 431-33 (1996).
194. Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 142, at 1186.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1188-89.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1189.
199. Id. at 1190.
200. Phillips, supra note 135, at 356.
201. Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 142, at 1191.
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sist of only one asset.20 2 ERISA itself contains no guidelines for
diversification. 20 3 Further, the DOL believes that questions
about diversification are issues of fact, not law, and refuses to
issue opinion letters about pension fund diversification plans
until after such plans have been created. 20 4
Some aspects of fiduciary duty for pension funds have re-
mained constant. The overarching imperative of pension fund
management is that the pension fund must be managed so as to
provide for the secure retirement of the worker. 20 5 The fiduciary
cannot delegate away his responsibility to oversee the invest-
ment of pension funds. 20 6
Bisceglia v. Bisceglia illustrates the consequences that can
occur when an unsophisticated investor, without specific guide-
lines from the DOL, invests too large a proportion of his pension
assets in a high risk instrument.20 7 Joseph Bisceglia was a
plumber who provided a pension plan for his employees. At the
suggestion of his accountant, Bisceglia hired an investment ad-
visor to manage the pension plan. At the investment advisor's
suggestion, he invested 90% of the pension assets in real estate
and 36% of the pension's total assets in one real estate partner-
ship. Although this investment produced high returns for a few
years, eventually the value plummeted, and Bisceglia saw the
pension assets decrease by 90%. The court said the trust was
undiversified, but did not hold the defendant liable. Bisceglia
and his employees, unfortunately, lost nearly all their retire-
ment savings because his pension fund was not adequately
diversified.20 8
3. Pension Fund Holdings of International Investments
It is no secret that developing nations and those who al-
ready trade emerging nation debt are eyeing pension funds and
hoping to increase their participation in the market. It has been
a "perennial hope" of emerging market debt traders that pension
202. Id.; See Reich v. King, 867 F. Supp. 341, 344-45 (D. Md., 1994) (holding
that a pension plan portfolio with 70% of its assets in mortgages in land from
one county was acceptable).
203. Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 142, at 1192.
204. Id. at 1212.
205. Lurie, supra note 138, at 330.
206. Reich v. Hosking, 20 EBC 1090 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that a pen-
sion plan trustee is personally liable for investment decisions made by a profes-
sional financial advisor who actively managed the plan, even if the trustee was
passive).
207. Bisceglia v. Bisceglia, 17 F.3d 393 (9th Cir. 1994).
208. Id.
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plans will make a significant switch in their investments from
corporate bonds to emerging markets debt instruments. 20 9 At
least one firm is creating an emerging markets global debt fund
specifically targeted to U.S. pension funds. 210 Indeed, more pen-
sion funds have been testing the emerging markets waters.211
In 1994, only fourteen pension funds reported holding at least
1% of their assets in Third World debt.212 In 1995 that number
rose to nineteen; in 1996 it was twenty-four. 213 Although most
of those limited their Third World debt exposure to only 1% of
their assets, Guilford College had 21%, and United Way of
Mercy (Chicago) had 33% invested in emerging nation debt. 214
Market watchers say they have detected a "subtle loosen-
ing" of investment guidelines, permitting portfolio managers to
increase the amount of developing nation debt in pension
funds.21 5 Pension funds are buying the new asset-backed
securitizations offered by emerging nations.2 16 Pension funds
that are already in the emerging nation debt market are begin-
ning to look at branching out into local currency-denominated
debt.2 17 This will add currency risk to the other risks of these
investments.
III. THE PROPOSAL: A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
TO SAFEGUARD PENSION FUND INVESTMENT
IN EMERGING NATION DEBT INSTRUMENTS
A. THE NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
An investment backed by the full faith and credit of a sover-
eign nation and with a rate of return twenty percent higher than
U.S. Treasuries is bound to attract many professional pension
fund managers, as well as individuals making decisions about
IRAs or 401(k) plans. When the sovereign nation in question is
a developing nation which has already defaulted on external
209. Emerging Markets Beckon Pension Funds, LDC DEBT REP., Sept. 23,
1996, available in 1996 WL 5559953.
210. ANZ set to launch new fund products, LDC DEBT REP., July 14, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 13917679.
211. IBM employees, for example, hold Bulgarian Interest Arrears Bonds in
their pension portfolio. 61 Fed. Reg. 47195, 47199, Dept. of Labor Pension and
Welfare Benefits Administration (1996).
212. Pension Plans Wade Deeper Into EM Debt, LDC DEBT REP., June 2,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7939482.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See supra note 209.
216. Elstein, supra note 95.
217. Hinchberger, supra note 68, at 138.
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debt obligations at least once in the last decade, the risk may be
too great to permit its inclusion in a pension portfolio. Investors
should apply the same caution to investments in corporations
located within high risk nations.
Third World debt is often invisible to the people who own
part of it. An investor who deliberately seeks out and purchases
a Costa Rican Brady bond knows that he has purchased a piece
of sovereign debt. If he so wishes, he can investigate the various
risks attendant to such an investment. Emerging market debt
funds are a transparent way to invest in sovereign debt. How-
ever, a less sophisticated investor who merely purchases shares
in a mutual fund may unwittingly hold developing country
debt.218 A person could assemble a "diversified" pension portfo-
lio holding an oil and gas securitization (including a healthy
dose of country risk), stocks in banks (with underreported Third
World loans), an uncollateralized Eurobond, a transparent
securitization of Third World debt, and shares in a mutual fund
with 20% of its assets in Third World debt. The cumulative ef-
fect of such investments would still yield a high risk portfolio.
There is currently no mechanism to protect pension investors
from such scenarios.
Some investment advisors believe that eclectic global debt
funds offer the best counterbalance to a portfolio otherwise in-
vested in U.S. stocks and Treasuries. 219 The argument is that a
collection of Third Word debt from a variety of issuers is weakly
correlated with U.S. financial markets and, therefore, an ideal
hedge against the vagaries of the U.S. economy and stock
market. 220
Between the investors who want to invest heavily in Third
World debt in the hopes of high yields on their investments, and
the investors who seek less risk but who nevertheless hold a
large proportion of Third World debt, there is a tremendous like-
lihood that very soon many pension plans will have significant
concentrations of Third World debt. Country risk, sovereign
risk, the lack of transparency in some investments, the lack of
218. For example, an investor who in 1993 invested in Fidelity's "New Mar-
kets Income" mutual fund should expect to find 100% of the fund's assets in-
vested in emerging market debt. The individual buying into Fidelity's "Asset
Manager" fund or Dean Witter's "North American Government" mutual fund
might well be surprised to learn that 20% of each of those funds was invested in
emerging nation debt instruments. Bary, supra note 9, at 9.
219. Thomas Easton, A Cosmopolitan Bond Portfolio, FORBES, June 16,
1997, at 228.
220. Id.
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investment guidance from the DOL,2 2 1 the poor health of the So-
cial Security program, and a pervasive expectation that the gov-
ernment will be the ultimate insurer of retirement funds make
it incumbent upon Congress to enact safeguards for investment
of pension funds in emerging nation debt.
Congress should enact legislation that recognizes the bene-
fits of an orderly secondary market for highly indebted nations'
debt and minimizes the risk that unsophisticated investors will
purchase this debt with their pension assets and later engage in
panic-induced selling. The volatility that exists in the absence
of such legislation is detrimental to both investors and debtor
nations. It would be impossible to mitigate the resulting effect
of such a panic on the emerging nations' debt market - even
those of nations with sterling credit histories. The industrial-
ized nations cannot marshal the resources to bail out every
global financial market crisis the way they did during the Mexi-
can peso crisis of 1994.222 Nor can government insurance
schemes make good on all risky investment choices despite the
present good health of the PBGC. Furthermore, there is no in-
surance safety net for the millions of workers whose pensions
are not in the PBGC-insured defined benefit plans. Prophylac-
tic action is needed now, before the risk curve associated with
the supply of Third World debt intersects with the unprece-
dented demand of the retiring Baby Boomers for retirement
income.
B. CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT LEGISLATION SIMILAR TO ILSA
FOR THE PURPOSE OF REGULATING PENSION PLAN
INVESTMENTS IN EMERGING NATION DEBT
Using ILSA as a model, Congress should enact an "Emerg-
ing Nation Debt Trading Supervision Act" (ENDTSA) that
would begin with a Congressional declaration of policy that the
United States wants to "assure the economic health and stabil-
221. The DOL will not issue pre-litigation opinions about the diversity of
pension plan portfolios, and judicial indications are that concentration of assets
in Third World debt may well be acceptable. Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note
142, at 1178. While courts have not ruled on the advisability of Third World
debt for pension funds specifically, they have held that concentration of 70% of
a pension fund's assets in the real estate of just one county was acceptable.
Reich v. King, 867 F. Supp. 341, 344-45 (D.Md. 1994).
222. A 1996 report issued by the G-10 nations (the 10 nations with the
world's largest economies) "states clearly that nobody should expect large-scale
bailouts in future." No More Debt Crises Please, ECONOMIST, May 18, 1996, at
74.
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ity of the United States and the other nations of the world." 223
It would mandate supervision to prevent imprudent and disrup-
tive investment practices for all pension funds whether they are
defined benefit, employer-sponsored defined contribution, or in-
dividually directed 401(k)s or IRAs. Although the goals of this
proposal could eventually be achieved through administrative
action, federal legislation would ensure uniform and timely com-
pliance more rapidly.224 Such legislation should not be left to
the states, because only the federal government has the re-
sources necessary to assess all relevant foreign and domestic
policy implications. 2 25
When legislators drafted ILSA they did not try to com-
pletely curtail lending by U.S. banks to developing nations.
Similarly, ENDTSA, as proposed in this Note, would not outlaw
all investment in emerging market debt. Instead, ENDTSA
would implement the three broad categories of reform the Fed-
eral Reserve recommended after the Mexican Peso Crisis of
1994: 1) increase transparency of the market for emerging na-
tion debt instruments; 2) increase availability of data about eco-
nomic variables from the debtor nations; and 3) create an early
warning system for market participants. 226
1. The DOL Would Have Oversight of the Various Provisions
of ENDTSA
The DOL is already charged with oversight for ERISA; it
would simplify administration of the new provisions added by
ENDTSA if they were administered by an agency already in-
volved in pension fund oversight. The DOL should be given the
authority to issue sanctions similar to the capital directives
which ILSA authorizes the FDIC to impose on banks that under-
take imprudent international lending.227 Such directives have
the force of an administrative final order and can be issued with-
out a hearing.228 It is anticipated that the DOL, like the FDIC,
would seldom be forced to use this power,229 but nevertheless it
223. This public policy declaration echoes the one found in ILSA. 12 U.S.C.
§3901(a)(1)(1994).
224. Lurie, supra note 138, at 341.
225. Argument for Exposure Ceiling, supra note 35, at 445.
226. Truman, supra note 40, at 208-09.
227. John C. Deal, Banking Law is Not for Sissies: Judicial Review of Capi-
tal Directives, 12 J.L. & COM. 185, 186-87 (1993).
228. Id.
229. The FDIC only used this power four times in a nine-year period. Id. at
201.
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should serve as a spur to ensure compliance. The legislation
should include a statement to the effect that due to the volatility
of the global financial market, it is of the utmost importance for
the DOL to have the authority necessary to ensure rapid compli-
ance with its prophylatic measures.
2. Pre-litigation Guidance for Pension Fund Investments
Under ENDTSA, the DOL would initiate a rulemaking pro-
ject to provide pre-litigation guidance for pension fund invest-
ments. ERISA fails to set guidelines for the diversification of
pension portfolios. 230 Under the modern portfolio theory of in-
vestment, the entire portfolio must be analyzed to determine
whether it is too risky.231 Thus far, the DOL has made it a pol-
icy not to rule on whether a pension plan is adequately diversi-
fied on the theory that this is a question of fact and not of law.2 32
Congress must direct the DOL to determine and then publish
the factors it will consider in analyzing the risk of a portfolio and
the percentage of pension assets that can be invested in a high
risk category. The DOL should supplement these guidelines
with pre-litigation guidance through regulatory opinion let-
ters. 23 3 This measure would help the small investor who does
not utilize the expertise of a professional investment advisor.
3. Increased Transparency
The SEC, which already oversees mutual funds, should en-
sure that all mutual funds increase the transparency of their
emerging nation investment strategy. This action would benefit
the large number of pension fund investors who control their
own pension funds and provide a basis for evaluation of diversi-
fication in larger defined benefit plans managed by employers.
(a) Mutual Fund Transparency
Each mutual fund registered in the United States should
specify in a prospectus what percentage of its assets may be allo-
cated to emerging nation debt. Currently, a fund prospectus can
simply indicate what percentage of its assets will be invested
"internationally." This is too broad a characterization to give a
meaningful measure of the risk incurred. All mutual funds reg-
istered in the United States should comply with the SEC's re-
230. Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 142, at 1192.
231. Johnson, supra note 193, at 421.
232. Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 142, at 1212.
233. Id. at 1211.
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quest that 80% of a mutual fund be invested in assets closely
related to the fund's name. Today that requirement is only
65%.234 The name of the mutual fund plays a large role in an
investor's decision to purchase it.235 A higher correlation be-
tween the name of a fund and its contents would make develop-
ing country debt more visible in a portfolio.
(b) Country Risk Prospectus
Under ENDTSA, a country risk prospectus should be sent to
all 401(k) and IRA holders who invest in emerging nation debt.
A "prospectus" specifically explaining emerging market debt in-
strument risks should be sent to an investor before he can place
an order to purchase a stock or bond mutual fund that has some
of its assets currently, or potentially, invested in Third World
debt. Once an investor has purchased shares in such a fund, the
investment company should send quarterly reports to the inves-
tor with updated specifics about the proportion and type of
emerging nation debt held in the mutual fund portfolio. There is
no way to ensure that the investor will read this material. Pro-
viding it, though, will put the investor on notice that he has in-
curred country risk.
4. Country Risk Rating System
The DOL should establish, in conjunction with the Inter-
agency Country Exposure Review Committee (ICERC), a coun-
try risk rating system. The ICERC is composed of
representatives from the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve.236 It already meets
to establish reserve requirements based on country risk for
banks making international loans.2 37 It assigns each nation a
country risk category and requires additional capital reserves
for bank loans to countries in three "problem" categories. 238 The
DOL should be able to obtain this information and use it to cre-
ate an early warning system for pension funds investing in
Third World debt. This early warning system of impending
country risk would be similar to the GAO's recommendations for
234. Zuckerman, supra note 104, at C1.
235. Id.
236. Argument for Exposure Ceiling, supra note 35, at 438.
237. Ed Paisley, U.S. to Release Credit Ratings for 15 Debtor Nations, Am.
BANKER, Nov. 15, 1988, at 4.
238. Id.
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commercial lenders. 239 If necessary, the DOL could develop its
own country risk analysis techniques.
In the event that the DOL believes a nation's political or
economic risks make it too hazardous for pension funds, it
should identify that nation to investors. ILSA contains a similar
measure, requiring lenders to highly-indebted nations to set
aside capital in Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves (ATRRs) to
compensate for this additional risk to capital.240 Once the DOL
has identified a nation as extremely high risk, it should publish
information and require defined benefit plans to take protective
measures.
241
5. Cooperation with Foreign Agencies
The DOL should seek to increase cooperative endeavors
with foreign countries as ILSA aims to do. The United States
already participates in a number of cooperative international
bank supervisory groups. 242 The DOL should be able to work
through these groups to increase the exchange of information
about the financial statistics of governments and their agencies
that float debt issues on the world capital markets. 243
Currently, there are no regulations that require mutual
fund managers to consider the interests of host countries.244 A
formal recognition of the connection between U.S. economic self-
interest and the interests of developing countries in the
ENDTSA legislation would be a useful reminder to the financial
markets of U.S. policy objectives.
6. Aggregate Country Risk Exposure
The DOL should analyze all large defined benefit pension
plans based on an aggregated measure of country risk exposure
in their portfolios. Bank regulators aggregate all loans to a for-
eign government, its agencies, and private international borrow-
ers within its borders to determine the total level of exposure to
239. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/NSIAD 88-87, INTERNA-
TIONAL BANKING: SUPERVISION OF OvERsEAs LENDING IS INADEQUATE (1988).
240. Vander Schaaf, supra note 23, at 698-700.
241. See discussion infra part III.B.6.
242. Bench & Sable, supra note 28, at 429.
243. Full information about its economic variables will benefit the borrow-
ing nation by attracting capital and promoting market discipline. Summers,
supra note 53, at 47.
244. Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 8, at 591.
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country risk.245 The DOL should consider whether the principle
of aggregation should be applied to a group of countries, due to
the risk of contagion in international investments.
(a) Additional Reporting Requirement
In order to assess the aggregate measure of country risk,
the DOL should institute an additional reporting requirement.
At present, a fund manager only has to tell the DOL the amount
of assets invested in a category of assets, without specifically
identifying the asset. For example, an Standard & Poor's index
fund would count as "one" security, as would an investment in a
single junk bond. 24 6 A plan with all its assets in one index fund
would be well-diversified, whereas a plan exclusively holding
one class of Bulgarian bonds with the same maturity date would
not be diversified. Yet, under current DOL reporting regula-
tions, both would appear to be equal. The DOL needs more in-
formation if it is to monitor the proportion of the pension
portfolio in emerging nation debt or maintain a list of plans for
an early-warning system.
(b) Authority to Issue Directives
The DOL should have the authority to issue directives to
defined benefit pension funds with too high a proportion of their
assets in speculative emerging nation debt. The DOL should
give the pension fund manager the option of selling the asset or
setting aside a compensating balance in U.S. Treasuries. This
measure would be similar to the ILSA measure requiring
ATRRs for loans to highly indebted nations.
C. ALTERNATIVES
1. Safe Harbor
Less administrative oversight would be needed if the DOL
simply mandated that small pension plans24 7 would meet all re-
quirements for diversity and prudent investment if they fol-
lowed the lead of large pension funds. Weiss and Sgaraglino
245. Argument for Exposure Ceiling, supra note 35, at 441. "Whether public
or private, all borrowers within a country are subject to... the same economic
conditions; a bank lending to many such borrowers is unlikely to achieve much
risk diversification. Moreover, all borrowers within a country must draw on the
same source of foreign exchange. . . ." Id.
246. Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 142, at 1212.
247. A small pension plan is defined as having fewer than 100 participants.
Id. at 1205.
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have proposed a "safe harbor" plan in a slightly different con-
text.248 This suggestion would release pension plan fiduciaries
from liability as long as they followed the same asset allocation
guidelines of large investors. 249 Such a plan can be successful
only if the DOL has already implemented successful guidelines
for the large pension plans to follow and if the decisions of the
large investor plans are readily available to the small invest-
ment plans.250 It would also be necessary for the investment
choices of the large plans to be replicated on a smaller scale by
the small investor. This is not always possible, as some instru-
ments require relatively high minimum investments.
2. Eliminate Pension Investments in High Risk Countries
A blanket prohibition against pension investments in high-
risk countries would be easy to implement and the costs would
be low. This prohibition would also eliminate any possibility
that future developing nations' debt crises would hurt pension
funds. Although this proposal would simplify the administra-
tive task for the DOL, it would have too many negative repercus-
sions for our economy and foreign relations. 251
D. RESPONSES TO POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF THIS PROPOSAL
1. It Would be too Difficult to Obtain and Analyze the Data
Necessary for Meaningful Country Risk Decisions
First, the federal government already has a country risk
analysis system in place that the DOL can utilize. Second, if the
DOL deems it appropriate, it can use secondary market prices as
a basis for assigning country risk.252 It costs nothing to access
secondary market prices. Third, whenever the data is incom-
plete for a country risk analysis, the DOL can downgrade the
country one risk level. This option should enhance compliance
of developing nations in supplying this economic data on a
timely basis.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. This, however, would create a free rider problem. It is unlikely that the
larger pension plans would be willing to make their investment decisions avail-
able at no cost.
251. Humphrey, supra note 55, at 215-16 (recognizing that international
economic relations have the potential to cause a national security crisis).
252. The GAO recommended this method of country risk assessment. See
supra note 237.
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2. Limiting Pension Investments in Emerging Nations Would
Stem the Flow of Foreign Capital Needed to Bolster
Economic Growth in Those Countries
There is a possibility that some nations would see these new
limits as punitive and take reciprocal action. 253 It is also likely
that developing nations will find alternative sources of financ-
ing, preferably from investors willing and able to make a long-
term commitment. The DOL and SEC should strengthen the
lines of communication with the financial leadership of these na-
tions because rapid capital movements into and out of a develop-
ing country can have negative repercussions for its business
climate and standard of living.254 The mechanisms in the pro-
posed ENDTSA would decrease the flow of capital in a very few
instances and should result overall in a more orderly flow of
capital.
3. Comprehensive Regulation of Pension Fund Investments in
Foreign Debt is not Feasible
Regulators may not always be able to keep pace with inno-
vative financing techniques in the market for derivatives. 255
Although this argument may apply to financial markets in gen-
eral, it does not apply to pension funds. If a time lag exists be-
tween the creation of a new derivative instrument and the
DOL's risk evaluation of it, there is no harm done to the pension
plan beneficiary or the emerging nation that issued the underly-
ing security.
IV. CONCLUSION
A Third World debt bond should not be the conduit by which
the banks unload past mistakes on an unwary public.256
The proposed ENDTSA legislation would benefit emerging
nations because it would help ensure an orderly flow of U.S. cap-
ital from pension plans for the continuation of trade financing
and economic development programs. 25 7 It is hoped that such
legislation would dampen speculation sufficiently to prevent
253. Argument for Exposure Ceiling, supra note 35, at 447.
254. North, supra note 53, at 48.
255. Raj Bhala, Equilibrium Theory, the FICAS Model, and International
Banking Law, 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 55 (1997) (arguing that banking regulators
cannot keep pace with the abuses in derivatives).
256. Puchala, supra note 83, at 168.
257. See Franco, supra note 30, at 516-17.
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panic selling at the first sign of a diminution of yields. It is rec-
ognized that the U.S. national economy is included in the con-
cept of national security. 258 Therefore, this proposal should be
considered beneficial to the nation as a whole, as well as to the
comfortable retirement of its senior citizens.
Emerging nation debt has been, and will continue to be, vi-
tally important to the global economy in general and the econ-
omy of the United States in particular. The advent of the
secondary market and the proliferation of securitized instru-
ments has diffused the risk inherent in these investments some-
what, but this risk has not been eliminated. It would be
imprudent, inconsistent with present law, antithetical to our na-
tional self-interest, and disastrous to the international economy
to ban these investments from pension plans outright. Carefully
crafted legislation, such as proposed herein, would help ensure
the economic stability of developing nations, while improving
the safety of U.S. pension assets, reporting standards, instru-
ment transparency, and regulation of the secondary market.
258. Humphrey, supra note 55, at 181.
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